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Abstract
We present a fast numerical algorithm for large scale zero-sum stochastic games with perfect
information, which combines policy iteration and algebraic multigrid methods. This algorithm
can be applied either to a true finite state space zero-sum two player game or to the discretiza-
tion of an Isaacs equation. We present numerical tests on discretizations of Isaacs equations
or variational inequalities. We also present a full multi-level policy iteration, similar to FMG,
which allows to improve substantially the computation time for solving some variational in-
equalities.
1 Introduction
In the present paper, we are interested in solving non-linear finite dimensional equations of the
form :
v(x) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
∑
y∈X
µ p(y |x, a, b) v(y) + r(x, a, b)
 ∀x ∈ X . (1)
with unknown the function v : X → R, where X := {1, . . . , n}. Here A := {1, . . . ,m1}, B :=
{1, . . . ,m2} are finite sets; the functions (x, a, b) ∈ X × A × B → r(x, a, b) ∈ R and (x, a, b, y) ∈
X ×A× B × X → p(y|x, a, b) ∈ R+ are given such that
∑
y∈X p(y|x, a, b) = 1; and 0 < µ < 1 is a
given constant. These equations appear when solving the following particular dynamic games.
An infinitely repeated game, or discrete time dynamic game, or infinite horizon multi-stage
game, consists in an infinite sequence of state transitions, where at each step, the transition depends
on the actions of the players, and each player receives a reward which depends on the state of the
game and the actions of all players at this step. The aim of each player is to maximize his own
objective function, for instance his payoff which is the sum of the rewards he received at all steps.
The game is stochastic when the state sequence is a random process with a Markov property, then
the objective function is the expected payoff. It is a two player zero-sum game when there are two
players with opposite rewards, hence player 2 aims to minimize player 1 objective function. When
the game does not stop in finite time (almost surely), one often consider a discounted payoff where
the reward at each step k is discounted by some multiplicative factor µk, with 0 < µ < 1.
Consider in particular a two player zero-sum discounted stochastic game with finite state space
X and action spaces A and B for player 1 and player 2 respectively. Denote by r(x, a, b) the reward
of player 1 when (at the current step) the state is x ∈ X and the actions of player 1 and 2 are
a ∈ A, b ∈ B respectively. Denote by p(y|x, a, b) the transition probability from state x to state
y when the actions of player 1 and 2 are a ∈ A, b ∈ B respectively. Assume that player 1 plays
before player 2, and that at each step, player 1 is choosing his action a ∈ A as a function of the
current state x ∈ X , and player 2 is choosing his action b ∈ B as a function of the current state
x ∈ X and action a ∈ A of player 1. Assume each player is maximizing his own objective function.
Under the previous finiteness conditions on (X , A, B), there exists a function v : X → R which
associates to each x ∈ X the expected payoff v(x) of player 1 when the initial state of the game
is x. This function is called the value or the value function of the game. It is the unique solution
of Equation (1) [54], called itself the dynamic programming equation or Shapley equation of the
game. Solving Equation (1) is important since it also gives the optimal stationary strategies of
the game, see section 2 for precise definitions of strategies and details. Discrete time zero-sums
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stochastic games arise in several domains of applications, such as military operations [43], network
flow control [4], pursuit-evasion problems (although often studied in the deterministic case), see
[46] for other applications references.
Equations of the form (1) can also be obtained as special discretizations of partial differential
equations associated to differential stochastic games, where the state space X is now a subset of Rd
(see section 3 for details). For instance the following non-linear elliptic partial differential equation
called Isaacs equation :
max
a∈A
min
b∈B
 d∑
i,j=1
qij(a, b, x)
∂2v(x)
∂xi∂xj
+
d∑
j=1
gj(a, b, x)
∂v(x)
∂xj
− λv(x) + r(x, a, b)
 = 0 ∀x ∈ X
(2)
allows one to solve a differential game in the same way as (1) solves a discrete time dynamic game.
Here A, B are either finite sets or subsets of some Rp spaces, λ ≥ 0 is a scalar, and (x, a, b) ∈ X ×
A×B → q(x, a, b) = (qij(x, a, b))i,j=1,...,d ∈ S+d , the set of positive definite symmetric d×d matrices,
(x, a, b) ∈ X×A×B → g(x, a, b) = (gj(x, a, b))j=1,...,d ∈ Rd, and (x, a, b) ∈ X×A×B → r(x, a, b) ∈
R are given functions. Such equations may be applied in particular to pursuit-evasion games (see for
instance [6]), but they also appear in solving H∞ optimal control problems (see for instance [9]),
or risk-sensitive optimal control problems [32], in particular for finance applications [25]. The
discretization of Equation (2) with a monotone scheme in the sense of [8] yields an equation of
the form (1) which can then be interpreted as the dynamic programming equation of a stochastic
game with discrete time and finite state space. Suitable possible discretizations schemes are for
instance : Markov chain discretizations [39, 40], monotone discretizations [8], full discretizations
of semi-Lagrangian type [6], and max-plus finite element method [3] for deterministic games or
control problems. Hence, we are interested in solving discretizations of Equation (2) which have
the form of Equation (1), in order to find an approximation of the value of the corresponding
differential stochastic game.
In the presence of a discount factor µ < 1, the nonlinear equation (1) can be solved by apply-
ing the fixed point iterations which are called, in the optimal control and game literature, value
iterations or the value iteration algorithm [10]. The iterations of this method are cheap but their
convergence slows considerably as the discount factor µ approaches one. Moreover, when we dis-
cretize Equation (2) with a finite difference or finite element method with a discretization step h,
we obtain an equation of the form (1) with a discount factor µ = 1−O(λh2), then when h is small
µ is close to one and the value iteration method is as slow as the Jacobi or Gauss-Seidel iterations
for a discretized linear elliptic equation. Another approach consists in the so called policy itera-
tion algorithm, initially introduced by Howard [38] for one player stochastic games (i.e. stochastic
control problems). Later adaptations of this algorithm were proposed for the two player games :
by Hoffman and Karp [35] for a special mean-payoff case, by Dernado [23] for approximations of
value functions in discounted stochastic games, in Puri thesis [49] for discounted stochastic games,
and by Cochet-Terrasson and Gaubert [19] for the general mean-payoff case. In all cases, policy
algorithm converges faster than the value iteration algorithm and in practice it ends in few steps
(see for instance [24] for numerical examples in the case of deterministic games).
A (feedback) policy (or pure Markovian stationary strategy, see Section 2 below) α : X → A
for the first player is a function which maps any x ∈ X to an action a ∈ A. Then, starting with
an initial policy for player 1, the policy iteration algorithm for the two player zero-sum stochastic
game consists in applying successively a policy evaluation step followed by a policy improvement
step. The policy evaluation step amounts to compute the value of the game for the current policy
α, that is the solution v of (1) where instead of taking the maximum of the expression inside
the “max”, one evaluates it with a = α(x). The policy improvement step consists in finding the
optimal policy for the current value function v, that is the policy optimizing the expression inside
the “max” in (1) when the value function is v. Computing the above value functions (in the policy
evaluation steps) is performed using the policy iteration algorithm for a one-player game. The
policy iteration algorithm is explained in more general settings in Section 4. It stops after a finite
number of steps when the sets of actions are finite, see [41, 14, 50] for one player games and [49, 19]
for two player games. In addition, under regularity assumptions on the maps r and p, the policy
iteration algorithm for a one player game with infinite action spaces is equivalent to Newton’s
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method, thus can have a super-linear convergence in the neighborhood of the solution, see [51, 15]
for superlinear convergence under general regularity assumptions, and [51, 2, 5] for order p > 0
superlinear convergence under additional regularity and strong convexity assumptions.
Each policy iteration for a one player game (or each iteration in the inner loop of the two player
algorithm) requires the solution of a linear system. Indeed, when we fix feedback policies α : X → A
and β : X → B for player 1 and 2 respectively, the system of equations (1) yields a linear system of
the form : v = µMv + r where v, r ∈ RX are respectively the value function of the game and the
vector of rewards for the fixed policies α and β, 0 < µ < 1 is the discount factor and M ∈ RX×X
is a Markov matrix whose elements are the transition probabilities Mxy = p(x|y, α(x), β(x)) ∈ R+
for x, y ∈ X (and each rowsum of M equals one). When the dynamic programming equation (1)
is coming from the discretization of an Isaacs partial differential equation (2), this linear system
corresponds to the discretization of a linear elliptic partial differential equation, hence it may be
solved in the best case in a time in the number of discretization points by using multigrid methods,
that is the cardinality |X | of the discretized state space X , or the size of the matrix M . For general
stochastic games on a finite state space X , since M is a Markov matrix, the matrix (I − µM) of
the linear system is an invertible M-matrix [13], and one may expect the same complexity when
solving them by using an algebraic multigrid method.
In the present paper, we consider the combination of policy iterations with the algebraic multi-
grid method (AMG) introduced by Brandt, McCormick and Ruge [17, 18], see also Ruge and
Stu¨ben [53]. We shall call AMGpi the resulting algorithm. This algorithm can be applied either
to a true finite state space zero-sum two player game or to the discretization of an Isaacs equa-
tion, although in the present paper we restrict ourselves to numerical tests for the discretization
of stochastic differential games, since the AMG algorithm needs some improvements to be ap-
plied to arbitrary non symmetric linear systems arising in game problems. Such an association
of multigrid methods with policy iteration has already been used and studied in the case of one
player games, that is discounted stochastic control problems (see Hoppe [36, 37] and Akian [1, 2]
for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations or variational inequalities, Ziv and Shimkin [48] for AMG
with learning methods). However, it is new in the case of two player games. We have implemented
this algorithm (in C) and shall present numerical tests on discretizations of Isaacs or Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations or variational inequalities, while comparing AMGpi with the combination
of policy iterations with direct solvers.
The complexity of two player zero-sum stochastic games is still unsettled, one only knows
that it belongs to the complexity class of NP∩coNP [49]. Indeed, the number of policy iterations is
bounded by the number of possible policies, which is exponential in the cardinality of X . Friedmann
has shown [34] that a strategy improvement algorithm requires an exponential number of iterations
for a “worst”-case family of games called parity games, this result can be extended to other types of
zero-sum stochastic games, in particular to mean-payoff and discounted zero-sum stochastic games,
and to undiscounted stochastic control problems (one-player games) as shown by Fearnley [27, 28].
However, as for Newton’s algorithm, convergence can be improved by starting the policy iteration
with a good initial guess, close to the solution. With this in mind, we present a full multi-level
policy iteration, similar to FMG. It consists in solving the problem at each grid level by performing
policy iterations until a convergence criterion is verified, then to interpolate the strategies and
value to the next level, in order to initialize the policy iterations of the next level, until the finest
level is attained. When at each level policy iterations are combined with the algebraic multigrid
method, we shall call FAMGpi the resulting full multi-level policy iteration algorithm. For one-
player discounted games with infinite number of actions and under regularity assumptions, one
can show [2, 1] that this kind of full multi-level policy iteration has a computing time in the order
of the cardinality |X | of the discretized state space X at the finest level. In Section 6, we give
numerical examples on variational inequalities for two player games, the computation time of which
is improved substantially using FAMGpi instead of AMGpi.
The paper is organized as follow. The three following sections are some recalls about basic
definitions on the subject. In Section 2, we introduce the definition of a two player zero-sum
stochastic game with finite state space and the corresponding dynamic programming equation.
Section 3 is about two player zero-sum stochastic differential games, we recall here the definition
of the Isaacs equation, the variational inequalities and the discretization scheme that we use.
Section 4 is devoted to the numerical background needed to solve the dynamic programming
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equation, including the policy iteration algorithm and the algebraic multigrid method. Section 5
describes our algorithms AMGpi and FAMGpi. We present in Section 6 some numerical tests on
discretizations of Isaacs equations and variational inequalities. Last section gives ending remarks.
2 Two player zero-sum stochastic games: the discrete case
The class of two player zero-sum stochastic game was first introduced by Shapley in the early fifties
[54]. We recall in this section the definition of these games in the case of finite state space and
discrete time (for more details see [54, 29, 55]).
We consider a finite state space X = {1, . . . , n}. A stochastic process (ξk)k≥0 on X gives the
state of the game at each point time k, called stage. At each of these stages, both players have the
possibility to influence the course of the game.
The stochastic game Γ(x0) starting from x0 ∈ X is played in stages as follows. The initial state
ξ0 is equal to x0 and known by the players. The player who plays first, say max, chooses an action
ζ0 in a set of possible actions A(ξ0). Then the second player, called min chooses an action η0 in a
set of possible actions B(ξ0, ζ0). The actions of both players and the current state determine the
payment r(ξ0, ζ0, η0) made by min to max and the probability distribution p(·|ξ0, ζ0, η0) of the new
state ξ1. Then the game continues in the same way with state ξ1 and so on.
At a stage k, each player chooses an action knowing the history defined by ιk = (ξ0, ζ0, η0, · · · , ξk−1, ζk−1, ηk−1, ξk)
for max and (ιk, ξk) for min. We call a strategy or policy for a player, a rule which tells him the
action to choose at any stage and in any situation. There are several classes of strategies. Assume
A(x) ⊂ A and B(x, a) ⊂ B for some sets A and B. A behavior or randomized strategy for max
(resp. min) is a sequence α¯ := (α0, α1, · · · ) (resp. β¯ := (β0, β1, · · · )) where αk (resp. βk) is a map
which to a history hk = (x0, a0, b0, . . . , xk−1, ak−1, bk−1, xk) with xi ∈ X , ai ∈ A(xi), bi ∈ B(xi, ai)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ k (resp. (hk, ak)) at stage k associates a probability distribution on a probability space
over A (resp. B) which support is included in the possible actions space A(xk) (resp. B(xk, ak)).
A Markovian (or feedback) strategy is a strategy which only depends on the information of the
current stage k: αk (resp. βk) depends only on xk (resp. (xk, ak)), then αk(hk) (resp. βk(hk, ak))
will be denoted αk(xk) (resp. βk(xk, ak)). It is said stationary if it is independent of k, then αk is
also denoted by α and βk by β. A strategy of any type is said pure if for any stage k, the values
of αk (resp. βk) are Dirac probability measures at certain actions in A(xk) (resp. B(xk, ak)) then
we denote also by αk (resp. βk) the map which to the history assigns the only possible action in
A(xk) (resp. B(xk, ak)).
In particular, if α¯ is a pure Markovian stationary strategy, then α¯ = (αk)k≥0 with αk = α for
all k and α is a map X → A such that α(x) ∈ A(x) for all x ∈ X . In this case, we also speak about
pure Markovian stationary strategy for α and we denote by AM the set of such maps. We adopt a
similar convention for player min : BM := {β : X ×A → B |β(x, a) ∈ B(x, a)∀x ∈ X , a ∈ A(x)}.
A strategy α¯ = (αk)k≥0 (resp. β¯ = (βk)k≥0) together with an initial state determines stochastic
processes (ζk)k≥0 for the actions of max, (ηk)k≥0 for the actions of min and (ξk)k≥0 for the states
of the game such that
P (ξk+1 = y | ιk = hk, ζk = a, ηk = b) = p(y |x, a, b) (3a)
P (ζk ∈ A | ιk = hk) = αk(hk)(A) (3b)
P (ηk ∈ B | ιk = hk, ζk = a) = βk(hk, a)(B) (3c)
where ιk := (ξ0, ζ0, η0, . . . , ξk−1, ζk−1, ηk−1ξk) is the history process, hk is a history vector at time
k: hk = (x0, a0, b0, . . . , xk−1, ak−1, bk−1, x) and A (resp. B) are measurable sets in A(x) (B(x, a)
resp.). For instance, for each pair of pure Markovian stationary strategies (α¯, β¯) of the two players,
that is such that for k ≥ 0 : αk = α with α ∈ AM and βk = β with β ∈ BM , the state process
(ξk)k≥0 is a Markov chain on X with transition probability
P (ξk+1 = y | ξk = x) = p(y|x, α(x), β(x, α(x))) for x, y ∈ X
and ζk = α(ξk) and ηk = β(ξk, ζk).
The payoff of the game Γ(x0) starting from x0 ∈ X is the expected sum of the rewards at all
steps of the game that max wants to maximize and min to minimize. In this paper we consider
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discounted games Γµ with discount factor 0 < µ < 1: the reward at time k is the payment made
by min to max times µk. When the strategies α¯ for max and β¯ for min are fixed, the payoff of the
game Γµ(x0, α¯, β¯) starting from x0 is then
J(x0, α¯, β¯) = Eα¯,β¯x0
[ ∞∑
k=0
µkr(ξk, ζk, ηk)
]
,
where Eα¯,β¯x0 denotes the expectation for the probability law determined by (3). A discounted game
can be seen equivalently as a game which has, in each stage, a stopping probability equal to 1−µ,
independent of the actions taken by both players. The value of the game starting from x0 ∈ X ,
Γµ(x0), is then given by
v(x0) = sup
α¯
inf
β¯
J(x0, α¯, β¯), (4)
where the supremum is taken over all strategies α¯ for max and the infimum is taken over all
strategies β¯ for min. Note that a non terminating game without any discount factor (or µ = 1) is
called ergodic.
We are concerned in finding optimal strategies for both players and the value of the discounted
game Γµ in each point. These are given by the dynamic programming equation [54] defined below.
Theorem 2.1 (Dynamic programming equations [54]). Assume A(x) and B(x, a) are finite sets
for all x ∈ X , a ∈ A(x). Then, the value v of the stochastic game Γµ, defined in (4), is the unique
solution v : X → R of the following dynamic programming equation:
v(x) = max
a∈A(x)
 min
b∈B(x,a)
∑
y∈X
µ p(y |x, a, b) v(y) + r(x, a, b)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F (v;x)
∀x ∈ X . (5)
Moreover, optimal strategies are obtained for both players by taking in (4) pure Markovian
stationary strategies α¯ for max and β¯ for min such that for all x in X , α(x) attains the maximum
in (5) :
α(x) ∈ argmax
a∈A(x)
F (v;x, a)
where
F (v;x, a) := min
b∈B(x,a)

∑
y∈X
µ p(y|x, a, b) v(y) + r(x, a, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F (v;x,a,b)
 , (6)
and for all x in X and a in A(x), β(x, a) attains the minimum in (6) :
β(x) ∈ argmin
b∈B(x,a)
F (v;x, a, b) .
Here we use the notation argmaxc∈C f(c) := {c ∈ C | f(c) = maxc′∈C f(c′)} and similarly for
argmin.
We denote by F the dynamic programming operator from RX to itself which maps v to the
function
F (v) : X → R
x 7→ F (v;x) (7)
where F (v;x) is defined in (5). This operator is monotone and contracting with constant µ in the
sup-norm, i.e. ‖F (v)− F (v′)‖∞ ≤ µ‖v − v′‖∞ for all v, v′ ∈ RX . Hence, fixed point iterations on
Equation (5), called value iterations in the optimal control and game literature, are contracting for
the sup-norm with constant µ.
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3 Two player zero-sum stochastic differential games: the
continuous case
Another class of games which we consider is the class of two player differential stochastic games
in continuous time. In these games, the state space is a regular open subset X of Rd and the
dynamics of the game is governed by a stochastic differential equation which is jointly controlled
by two players (see [31, 56] and below). In this case, the value of the game (defined below) is
solution of a non linear elliptic partial differential equation of type (2), called Isaacs equation (see
also [31, 56]). The discretization of this equation with a monotone scheme in the sense of [8] yields
the dynamic programming equation (5) of a stochastic game with discrete state space which was
described in the previous section.
In the first following subsection, we give the definitions of differential stochastic games with a
bounded state space and a discounted payoff. Then, in the next subsection, we present a subclass
of these differential games called optimal stopping time games. Finally, in the last subsection, we
introduce the finite difference discretization scheme that we use to discretize the Isaacs equation (12)
and (13) respectively. Numerical examples of such kind of games will be presented in section 6.
3.1 Differential games with regular controls.
Assume now that the state space is a regular open subset X of Rd. Suppose a probability space
Ω is given, as well as a filtration (Ft)t≥0 over it (that is a non decreasing sequence of σ-algebras
over Ω). We consider games which dynamics is governed by the following stochastic differential
equation :
dξt = g(ξt, ζt, ηt) dt+ σ(ξt, ζt, ηt) dWt, (8)
with initial state ξ0 = x ∈ X . Here Wt is a d′-dimensional Wiener process on (Ω, (Ft)t≥0); ζt
and ηt are stochastic processes taking values in closed subsets A and B of Rp and Rq respectively;
(x, a, b) ∈ X × A × B 7→ g(x, a, b) ∈ Rd and X × A × B 7→ σ(x, a, b) ∈ Rd×d′ are given functions.
The dimension d′ of the Wiener process may be different from d and is given by the modeling of
the problem. Assuming that ζt and ηt are adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0 (that is for all k ≥ 0,
ζt and ηt are Ft-measurable), allows one to define the stochastic process ξt satisfying Equation (8)
and it is a necessary condition to the assumption that the actions of the two players depend only on
the past states and actions. We also consider strategies α¯ = (αt)t≥0 (resp. β¯ = (βt)t≥0) of player
max (resp. min) determining the process (ζt)t≥0 (resp. (ηt)t≥0). In particular, for pure Markovian
stationary strategies, one has ζt = α(ξt) and ζt = β(ξt, ζt).
When X = Rd, the discounted payoff of the game with discount rate λ > 0 is given by :
J(x; α¯, β¯) = Eα¯,β¯x
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−λtr(ξt, ζt, ηt) dt | ξ0 = x
]
(9)
where (x, a, b) ∈ X × A × B 7→ r(x, a, b) ∈ R is the (instantaneous, or running) reward function.
Now, we consider that X is a regular open subset X of Rd. In this case, we denote by τ the first
exit time of the process (ξt)t≥0 from X , i.e. τ = inf {t ≥ 0|ξt /∈ X}. Then, the discounted payoff of
the game stopped at the boundary is :
J(x; α¯, β¯) = Eα¯,β¯x
[ ∫ τ
0
e−λtr(ξt, ζt, ηt) dt+ e−λτψ1(ξτ ) | ξ0 = x
]
(10)
where the function x ∈ ∂X → ψ1(x) ∈ R is called the terminal reward. The value function of the
differential stochastic game starting from x is defined as in section 2 by
v(x) = sup
α¯
inf
β¯
J(x; α¯, β¯) (11)
where the supremum is taken over all strategies α¯ for max and the infimum is taken over all
strategies β¯ for min.
As previously, we are interested in finding the value function of the game and the correspond-
ing optimal strategies. We denote by L(v;x, a, b) the following second order partial differential
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operator :
L(v;x, a, b) :=
d∑
i,j=1
qij(x, a, b)
∂2v(x)
∂xi∂xj
+
d∑
j=1
gj(x, a, b)
∂v(x)
∂xj
− λv(x),
with (qij)i,j=1,..,d =
1
2
σσT . When d′ ≥ d and σ(x, a, b) is onto for all x ∈ X , a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
the matrix q(x, a, b) is of full rank and the operator L is elliptic. The value of the game v is
solution, under some regularity assumptions on Ω and on the functions g, σ, r and ψ (for instance
boundedness and uniform Lipschitz continuity), of the dynamic programming equation, called
Isaacs partial differential equation : maxa∈A
(
min
b∈B
(L(v;x, a, b) + r(x, a, b) )
)
= 0 for x ∈ X
v(x) = ψ1(x) for x ∈ ∂X .
(12)
This has been shown in the viscosity sense in [31]. See also [20] and references therein for uniqueness
of the solution of (12). If the value v of the game is a classical solution of (12), α and β are strategies
such that for all x in X and a in A(x), α(x) and β(x, a) are the unique actions that realize the
maximum and the minimum in Equation (12) for max and min respectively, then α and β are pure
Markovian stationary strategies, that are optimal for (11) (with ξ, ζ, η satisfying (8), (10), with
ζt = α(ξt) and ηt = β(ξt, ζt)).
Note that for a game with one player, i.e. for a stochastic control problem, Equation (12)
is the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Also when X is bounded, and L is strongly
uniformely elliptic (if for some c > 0, q(x, a, b) ≥ cI for all x ∈ X , a ∈ A, b ∈ B), then the case
λ = 0 can also be considered.
3.2 Differential games with optimal stopping control
When the action (ζt, ηt) of the players are not continuous or not bounded, the dynamic program-
ming equation of the game is no more of the form of Equation (12), but may be a variational
inequality or a quasi-variational inequality, see for instance [33, 11] for the case of optimal stopping
games with one or two players and [30, 12] for impulse or singular control.
We consider here an optimal stopping game, that is a game in which one of the players have
the choice of stopping the game at any moment (see [33] for a more general case). We assume here
that max has this ability. Then at each time t, he chooses to stop or not the game, that is he is
choosing an element of the action space {0, 1} where 1 means that the game is continuing, 0 that
the game stops, with ζs = 0 and ξs = ξt for s ≥ t when ζt = 0 (i.e. g(x, 0, b) = 0, σ(x, 0, b) = 0
∀b ∈ B, x ∈ X in (8)). The second player min plays as previously and we consider the same model
as in previous subsection. The value of a strategy α¯ for max determines a process (ζt)t≥0 adapted
to the filtration of (ξt)t≥0 (that is (σ(ξt))t≥0), then a stopping time κ = inf {t ≥ 0|ζt = 0} adapted
to the process (ξt)t≥0 and vice versa.
So if r(x, 0, b) = λψ2(x)∀b ∈ B, the discounted payoff (10) can be written as a function of the
stopping time κ instead of α¯ :
J(x;κ, β) = Eκ,βx
[ ∫ κ
0
e−λtr(ξt, 1, ηt) dt+ e−λκψ2(ξκ) 1Iκ<τ + e−λτψ1(ξτ ) 1Iκ=τ
∣∣∣ ξ0 = x ] .
Indeed, if κ < τ , then ξs = ξκ ∈ X , s ≥ κ, so τ = +∞, and
∫ τ
κ
e−λtr(ξt, ζt, ηt) dt = e−λκψ2(ξκ).
The value function (11) of the game starting from x is then given by :
v(x) = sup
κ
inf
β
J(x;κ, β)
where the supremum is taken over all stopping times κ ≤ τ and the infimum is taken over all
strategies β for min.
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Since the variable “a” appears only when equal to 1, one can ommit it in equations, hence
Equation (12) becomes :
max
{
min
b∈B
(L(v;x, b) + r(x, b) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1©
, λ(ψ2(x)− v(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
2©
}
= 0 for x in X ,
v(x) = ψ1(x) for x ∈ ∂X ,
(13)
since λ > 0, one can divide the term 2© by λ, and get the variational inequality in the usual form
used in viscosity solutions literature. In another usual way, Equation (13) can be written as :
for x ∈ X

min
b∈B
(L(v;x, b) + r(x, b) ) ≤ 0
ψ2(x)− v(x) ≤ 0(
min
b∈B
(L(v;x, b) + r(x, b) )
)
(ψ2(x)− v(x)) = 0
(14)
with v(x) = ψ1(x) for x ∈ ∂X . Both Equation (13) and Equation (14) are called variational
inequalities. Note however, that Equation (13), or the resulting equation obtained by simplifying
by λ in 2©, reveals more the control nature and can be used to define viscosity solutions (where one
need to write equations in the form F (x, v(x), Dv(x), D2v(x)) = 0 on X ), whereas Equation (14)
is more adapted to a variational approach.
As for (12), if v is a classical solution of (13) or (14), if for all x in X : α(x) is equal to 1 or
0 if resp. 1© or 2© is maximum in (13) and if for all x in X : β(x, 1) is the action b ∈ B which
realize the minimum in 1©, then an optimal pure Markovian stationary strategy is obtained by
taking ηt = β(ξt, 1) and κ equal to the first time when α(ξt) = 0. So this equation behaves as
Equation (12) but where the first player has a discrete action space equal to {0, 1}, 1 meaning
continue to play and 0 meaning stop the game. This variational inequality can be treated with the
same methods as (12).
3.3 Discretization
Several discretization methods may transform equations (12) or (13) into a dynamic programming
equation of the form (5). This is the case when using Markov discrezation of the diffusion’s (12)
as in [39, 40] and in general when using discrezation schemes that are monotone in the sense of [8].
One can obtain such discretizations by using the simple finite difference scheme below when there
are no mixed derivative (that is σσT is a diagonal matrix). Under less restrictive assumptions on
the coefficients, finite difference schemes with larger stencil also lead to monotone schemes [16, 45].
In the deterministic case (when σ ≡ 0), one can also use semi-Lagrangian scheme [6, 7] or max-plus
finite element method [3], both of them having the property of leading to a discrete equation of
the form (5).
We suppose that X is the d-dimensional open unit cube. Let h = 1m (m ∈ N∗) denote the
finite difference step in each coordinate direction, ei the unit vector in the i
th-coordinate direction,
and x = (x1, . . . , xd) a point of the uniform grid Xh = X ∩ (hZ)d. Equation (12) is discretized by
replacing the first and second order derivatives of v by the following approximation, for i = 1, . . . , d :
∂v(x)
∂xi
∼ v(x+ hei)− v(x− hei)
2h
(15)
or
∂v(x)
∂xi
∼

v(x+ hei)− v(x)
h
when gi(x, a, b) ≥ 0
v(x)− v(x− hei)
h
when gi(x, a, b) < 0.
(16)
∂2v
∂x2i
(x) ∼ v(x+ hei)− 2v(x) + v(x− hei)
h2
, (17)
Approximation (15) may be used when L is uniformly elliptic and h is small, whereas (16) has
to be used when L is degenerate (see [39, 40]). For equations (12) and (13), these differences
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are computed in the entire grid Xh, by prolonging v on the “boundary”, ∂Xh := ∂X∩(hZ)dusing
Dirichlet boundary condition:
v(x) = ψ(x) ∀x ∈ ∂X ∩ (hZ)d.
We obtain a system of Nh non linear equations of Nh unknowns, the values of the function
vh : x ∈ Xh 7→ vh(x) ∈ R :
max
a∈A
( min
b∈B
(Lh(vh; (x, a, b)) + r(x, a, b) ) ) = 0 ∀x ∈ Xh , (18)
where Nh = ]Xh ∼ 1/hd and Lh is a function which to v ∈ RXh , x ∈ Xh, a ∈ A, b ∈ B associates
the approximation of L(v;x, a, b).
When there are no mixed derivatives (qi,j(x, a, b) = 0 if i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}), the discretiza-
tion is monotone in the sense of [8], then if (12) has a unique viscosity solution, the solution vh
of (18) converges uniformly to the solution v of (12) [8]. Moreover, multiplying Equation (18) by
ch2 with c small enough, it can be rewritten in the form (5), with a discount factor µ = 1−O(λch2).
A similar result holds for the discretization of (13) (by multiplying only the diffusion part by ch2).
We refer to section 6.1 for an example of an Issacs equation (23) whose discretization (using
scheme (16)- (17)) yields an equation (24) which has the form of (5).
4 Background for numerical solution of discrete dynamic
programming equations
In this section, we present the policy iteration algorithm to solve the dynamic programming equa-
tion (5) of a two player zero-sum discounted stochastic game with finite state space. We first
present the policy iteration algorithm for a one player game which is then used in the following
subsection to define the policy iteration algorithm for the two player case. The last part of this
section is devoted to a recall of multigrid methods which we will use in the policy iterations for
solving the linear systems.
4.1 Policy iteration algorithm for one player games
First, we consider a one player stochastic game with a min player and finite state space X . In this
case, the dynamic programming operator F , mapping Rn to itself, is given for each x ∈ X by :
F (v;x) = min
b∈B(x)
∑
y∈X
µ p(y|x, b) v(y) + r(x, b)
 . (19)
This game is more commonly called a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with finite state space X ,
we refer to [38, 22, 50] for a deeper description on this topic. Then, the discounted value of the
game starting in x ∈ X is given by :
v(x) = inf
β¯
Eβ¯x
[ ∞∑
k=0
µkr(ξk, ηk)
]
,
where the processes ξk, ηk and strategies β¯ are defined such as in the section 2. The value v of the
game is solution of the dynamic programming equation : v(x) = F (v;x) for x in X . Then the
policy iteration algorithm for Markov Decision Processes, that was first introduce by Howard [38],
is given in Algorithm 1 and give us the discounted value of the game v : X → R and the optimal
policy for min.
Each policy iteration of Algorithm 1 strictly improves the current policy and produces a non
increasing sequence of values (vk)k≥1. It implies that the algorithm never visits twice the same
policy. Hence if the action sets are finite in each point of X , the policy iterations stop after
a finite time (see for instance [51, 41, 14]). Moreover, under regularity assumptions, the policy
iteration algorithm for a one player game with infinite action spaces is equivalent to Newton’s
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Algorithm 1 Policy iteration algorithm for Markov Decision Processes (one player game)
Given an initial policy β0 ∈ BM , the policy iterations consist in applying successively the two
following steps:
1. Compute the value vk+1 of the game with fixed feedback policy βk, that is the solution of
vk+1(x) =
∑
y∈X
µ p(y|x, βk(x)) v(y) + r(x, βk(x)) (20)
2. Improve the policy: Find the optimal feedback policy βk+1 for the value vk+1, i.e. for each x
in X , chose βk+1(x) such that :
βk+1(x) ∈ argmin
b∈B(x)
∑
y∈X
µ p(y |x, b) vk+1(y) + r(x, b)

until we cannot improve the policy anymore.
method [2, 5, 15, 51]. Indeed, define G(v) = F (v)− v, then the problem is to find the solution of
G(v) = 0 where all entries of G are concave functions. The policy improvement step can be seen as
the computation of an element of the sup-differential of G in the current approximation vk+1 and
the value improvement step computes the zero of the previous sup-differential. When G is regular,
the sequence of value functions (vk)k≥1 is exactly the sequence of the Newton’s algorithm.
4.2 Policy iteration algorithm for two player games
Now, we give the policy iteration algorithm for solving a two player zero-sum stochastic games with
finite state space X , as defined in Puri thesis [49]. Recall the definitions of section 2, we need to
solve the dynamic programming Equation (5) which give us the value of the game (Equation (4))
and the optimal strategies for both players. For a fixed pure feedback policy for max α ∈ AM , the
value v of the game is solution of the equation v = Fα(v) where Fα is an operator mapping Rn to
itself whose x-coordinate is given by :
Fα(v;x) := F (v;x, α(x)) = min
b∈B(x,α(x))
∑
y∈X
µ p(y|x, α(x), b) v(y) + r(x, α(x), b)
 ,
for each x ∈ X and v ∈ Rn. Note that Fα is the dynamic programming operator of a one player
game with only the min player. Then the policy iteration algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Step 1 of Algorithm 2 is performed by using the policy iteration algorithm for a one player game.
That is, given an initial feedback policy for min βs,0 ∈ BM , we iterate on min policies βs,k ∈ BM
and value functions vs,k. Then at each step k of the interior policy iteration (Algorithm 1 step 1),
one computes vs,k+1, the value of the game with fixed strategies αs ∈ AM for max and βs,k ∈ BM
for min. This is done by solving the linear system :
vs,k+1 = µMα
sβs,k vs,k+1 + rα
sβs,k , (21)
where for all α ∈ AM , β ∈ BM : Mαβ ∈ Rn×n is a stochastic matrix whose elements are defined
by (Mαβ)x,y = p(y|x, α(x), β(x)) for all x, y ∈ X and rαβ ∈ Rn is the vector whose elements are
defined by (rαβ)x = r(x, α(x)β(x)) for x ∈ X .
As for the one player case, each iteration of the policy iteration algorithm strictly improve the
current policy, hence it can never visit twice the same policy. Moreover, the algorithm produces a
non decreasing (resp. non increasing) sequence of values (vs)s≥1 (resp. (vs,k)k≥1) of the external
loop (resp. internal loop), see [49, 19]. It follows that if the action sets for both players are finite
in each point of X , the policy iterations stop after a finite time [49].
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Algorithm 2 Policy Iteration
Given an initial policy α0 ∈ AM for max, the policy iterations consist in applying successively the
two following steps:
1. Compute the value vs+1 of the game with fixed feedback policy αs, that is the solution of
vs+1 = Fα
s
(vs+1)
by using Algorithm 1.
2. Improve the policy: Find the optimal feedback policy αs+1 of max for the value vs+1 , i.e.
for each x in X , chose αs+1(x) such that :
αs+1(x) ∈ argmax
a∈A(x)
F (vs+1;x, a)
where F (v;x, a) is defined by (6).
until we cannot improve the policy anymore.
4.3 AMG
The linear systems defined in (21) have all the form v = µMv + r where M a Markov matrix. We
solve them using algebraic multigrid methods which we recall in this section.
Standard multigrid was originally created in the seventies to solve efficiently linear elliptic
partial differential equations (see for instance [42]). It works as follows. Multigrid methods require
discretizations of the given continuous equation on a sequence of grids. Each of them, starting from
a coarse grid, being a refinement of the previous until a given accuracy is attained. The size of the
coarsest grid is chosen such that the cost of solving the problem on it is cheap. Assume also that
transfer operators between these grids are given: interpolation and restriction. Then, a multigrid
cycle on the finest grid consists in : first, the application of a smoother on the finest grid; then a
restriction of the residual on the next coarse grid; then solving the residual problem on this coarse
grid using the same multigrid scheme; then, interpolate this solution (which is an approximation
of the error) and correct the error on the fine grid; finally, the application of a smoother on the
finest grid. If the multigrid components are properly chosen, this process is efficient to find the
solution on the finest grid. Indeed, in general the relaxation process is smoothing the error which
then can be well approximated by elements in the range of the interpolation. It implies, in good
cases, that the contraction factor of the multigrid method is independent of the discretization step
and also the complexity is in the order of the number of discretization points. We shall refer to
this standard method as geometric multigrid.
Algebraic multigrid method, called AMG, has been initially developed in the early eighties (see
for example [18, 17, 53]) for solving large sparse linear systems arising from the discretization of
partial differential equations with unstructured grids or PDE’s not suitable for the application of
the geometric multigrid solver or large discrete problems not derived from any continuous problem.
The AMG method consists of two phases, called “setup phase” and “solving phase”. In contrast
to geometric multigrids, the mode of constructing the coarse levels (coarse “grids”) which consti-
tute the setup phase, is based only on the algebraic equations. The points of the fine grids are
represented by the variables and coarse grids by subset of these variables. The selection of those
coarse variables and the construction of the transfer operators between levels are done in such a
way that the range of the interpolation approximates the errors not reduced by a given relaxation
scheme. Then the “solving phase” is performed in the same way as a geometric multigrid method
and consists of the application of a smoother and a correction of the error by a coarse grid solution.
The whole process is briefly recall below.
Consider a system of n linear equations given in the matrix form:
Av = f (22)
where the matrix A ∈ Rn×n and the vector f Rn are given, and we are looking for the vector
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v ∈ Rn. We call fine grid Ω0 the set of all variables of the system, i.e. Ω0 = {1, . . . , n}.
First, recall that a relaxation method consist of the following approximations:
u← Su+ Sof with S = I − SoA
where S is called the smoothing operator and I is the identity operator in Rn×n. The error e = u−v
propagates as
e← Se.
The method is said to converge if ρ(S) < 1 where ρ(S) = maxi |λi| is the spectral radius of S
with λi his eigenvalues. For example, the smoother operator of the weighted Jacobi method is
S = I − wD−1A and that of the Gauss-Seidel is S = I − L−1A where D and L are the diagonal
and lower triangular part of the matrix A resp.
Assume Ωl the grid on level l where level 0 correspond to the finest grid Ω0. The construction
of the coarse grid Ωl+1 from the fine grid Ωl, consists in the splitting of the nl variables from the
grid Ωl into two distinct subsets, namely C which contains the variables belonging to both grids,
Ωl and Ωl+1, and F the variables belonging to the grid Ωl only. We have then Ωl = C ∪ F . The
coarse grid Ωl+1 = C contains nl+1 variables. This splitting is based on the “connections” between
the variables on level l [18, 53] and such as the range of the associate interpolation or prolongation
operator P ll+1 accurately approximates the errors not efficiently reduced by the relaxation phase
(these errors are “smooth” in the algebraic multigrid terminology). The restriction operator Rl+1l
maps residuals from grid Ωl to the grid Ωl+1. In [18, 53], the operator is fixed to beRl+1l = (P ll+1)T .
The coarse grid operator is defined by Al+1 = Rl+1l AlP ll+1 where Al+1 is the approximation of Al
on Ωl+1 and A0 = A. Similarly, for any vector vl ∈ Rnl we denote vl+1 = Rl+1l vl its restriction
on Ωl+1. This construction can be repeated recursively from the finest level l = 0 to the coarsest
level L.
The solution phase consists in applying the multigrid cycle described in Algorithm 3, it is called
V(ν1,ν2)-cycle if γ = 1 and W(ν1,ν2)-cycle if γ = 2. Convergence theorem for the V-cycle is given
Algorithm 3 Multigrid scheme ul ←MG(ul, f l)
if l < L then
pre relaxation :
ul ← Sul + Sof l (on Ωl) ν1 times
coarse grid correction :
f l+1 ← Rl+1l (f l −Alul)
ul+1 ← 0
ul+1 ←MG(ul+1, f l+1) γ times
ul ← ul + P ll+1ul+1
post relaxation :
ul ← Sul + Sof l (on Ωl) ν2 times
else
Solve ALuL = fL
end if
in[53] for A symmetric and positive definite. See also [18, 17, 26], for two-level convergence for
linear systems where the matrix of the system is a M-matrix, symmetric and positive definite. Also
we can find in the literature, two-grid convergence analysis for non-symmetric linear system in [47]
and [44].
5 A multigrid algorithm for discrete dynamic programming
equations
5.1 Policy iteration combined with algebraic multigrid method (AMGpi)
Recall that in the policy iteration algorithm for games at each step k of the interior policy itera-
tion, we have to solve a linear system (21) which is of the form v = µMv + r with M a Markov
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Figure 1: Representation of the nested iterations of AMGpi.
matrix and 0 < µ < 1 the discount factor. Since (I − µM) are non singular M -matrices, we use
AMG to solve those systems. For shortness in the sequel, we shall call the resulting algorithm
AMGpi that is the combination of policy iterations and AMG. The name AMGpi refers also to the
numerical implementation of this algorithm. Note that in practice, in Algorithm 1 (equivalently
in Algorithm 2), the policy iterations are stopped when after Step 1, the norm of the residual,
rv = F (v) − v, is smaller than a given value denoted by . We used this stopping criterion in
AMGpi. The iterations of AMGpi are summarized in the scheme represented in Figure 1 where
(vs,k,0, · · · , vs,k,m, · · · , vs,k+1,0) is a sequence of value functions generated by the multigrid solver.
The algebraic multigrid methods allows us to solve linear systems arising from either the discretiza-
tion of Isaacs or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations or a true finite state space zero-sum two player
game. However in the present paper, we restrict ourselves to numerical tests for the discretization
of stochastic differential games, since the AMG algorithm needs some improvements to be applied
to arbitrary non symmetric linear systems arising in game problems.
In the one player game case, convergence results of combination of policy iteration and geometric
multigrid method have been established by Hoppe [36, 37] and Akian [1, 2].
5.2 Full multi-level policy iteration (FAMGpi)
Recall that the number of policy iterations can be exponential in the cardinality of the state
space X . However, as for Newton’s algorithm, convergence can be improved by starting the policy
iterations with a good initial guess, close to the solution. With this in mind, we present a full
multi-level scheme, that we shall call FAMGpi. As in standard FMG, starting from the coarsest
level, it consists in solving the problem at each grid level by performing policy iterations AMGpi
until a convergence criterion is verified, then to interpolate the strategies and value function to the
next level, in order to initialize the policy iterations of that level. This scheme is repeated until
the finest level is attained.
The algorithm FAMGpi only applies to Isaacs partial differential equations (12). It works as
follows. The state space X is first discretized on sequence of LF + 1 grids : XLF ⊂ · · · ⊂ X1 ⊂
X0 = Xh such that on grid Xl, 0 ≤ l ≤ LF , the discretization step is hl = 2lh, where h is the
discretization step chosen on the finest grid Xh. Then, the Isaacs PDE is discretized on all levels,
0 ≤ l ≤ LF , using the finite differences scheme (16)- (17). For level l, we denote by Fl : Xl → Xl
the dynamic programming operator, (v)l : Xl → R the value of game, x ∈ Xl → (α)l(x) ∈ A(x)
and (x ∈ Xl, a ∈ A(x)) → (β)l(x, a) ∈ B(x, a) the strategies of max and min respectively. We
denote by Il−1l the linear interpolation operator which maps any vector (v)l from RXl to RXl−1 :
Il−1l (v)l(x) =
{
(v)l(x) x ∈ Xl∑
y∈N (x)
1
](N ) (v)
l(y) x ∈ Xl−1 \ Xl
where N (x) = {y ∈ Xl | ‖x− y‖2 <= hl} for x ∈ Xl−1 \ Xl, and we denote by U l−1l the operator
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which interpolates a strategy from grid Xl to grid Xl−1, for instance for a strategy of max :
U l−1l ((α)l)) =
{
(α)l(x) x ∈ Xl
a0 ∈ A(x) x ∈ Xl−1 \ Xl
where a0 is chosen arbitrary A(x) in for x ∈ Xl−1\Xl. We denote by AMGpi(α, β, v, ) the algorithm
AMGpi with initial strategy α for player max iterations, initial policy β for the first iteration of
player min, value v as initial approximation for the first call of AMG and  the stopping criterion
for the policy iterations. Then FAMGpi algorithm is given in Algorithm 4 where c > 0 is a given
constant.
Algorithm 4 FAMGpi
Given an initial (α0)LF , (β0)LF and (v0)Lf on level LF ,
for l = LF to 1 do
((α)l, (β)l, (v)l)← AMGpi((α0)l, (β0)l, (v0)l, ch2l ) on level l
(v0)l−1 = Il−1l (v)l
(α0)l−1 = U l−1l (α)l and (β0)l−1 = U l−1l (β)l
end for
solve v = F (v) on Xh by using AMGpi((α0)0, (β0)0, (v0)0, )
Figure 2 illustrates the FAMGpi algorithm when V-cycles are use in AMGpi. The dashed lines
represent the interpolation of the solution and strategies from a coarse grid X l to the next fine
grid X l−1. The continuous V-lines are the V-cycles of AMGpi which are not fixed in number since
at each level, AMGpi cycles are performed until a given criterion is attained.
Note that our FAMGpi program only applies to stochastic differential games since for them
coarse representation, including equations and strategies, can be easily constructed by tacking
different sizes of discretization step.
For one-player discounted games with infinite number of actions and under regularity and strong
convexity assumptions, it is shown in [2, 1] that this kind of full multi-level policy iteration has a
computing time in the order of the cardinality of X .
6 Numerical results
In this section, we apply our programs AMGpi and FAMGpi, which were implemented in C, to
examples of two player zero-sum stochastic differential games. Let first give some details about
the implementation of the algorithms that we use and some notations for the numerical results.
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Figure 3: Graph of sin(x1)× sin(x2) on X = [0, 1]× [0, 1].
The AMG linear solver of AMGpi implements the construction phase, including the coarsing
scheme and the interpolation operator, described in [53] and the general recursive multigrid cycle
for the solution phase (see Algorithm 3). In the tests, W(1,1)-cycles were used and the chosen
smoother is a CF relaxation method, that is a Gauss Seidel relaxation scheme that relaxes first on
C-points and then on F-points. The AMGpi program is the implementation of the method explained
in section 5 with the above AMG linear solver. The FAMGpi program is the implementation of
Algorithm 4.
The following notations are used in the tables: s denotes the iteration over max policies and
kmax is the corresponding number of iterations for min policies, that is the number of linear
systems solved at iteration s. The residual error of the game is denoted by rv = F (v)− v and the
exact error, when known, by e = F (v) − u where u is the discretized exact solution of the game.
The infinite norm and discrete L2 norm are given for each of them.
6.1 Isaacs equations
The first example concern a diffusion problem where the value v : X → R of the game is solution
of the following Isaacs PDE : maxa∈A minb∈B
(
∆v(x) + (a · ∇v(x))− (b · ∇v(x))− λv(x) + ‖b‖
2
2
2
+ f(x)
)
= 0 x in X ,
v(x) = ψ1(x) x in ∂X
(23)
where X =]0, 1[×]0, 1[ is the unit square, A = {a ∈ R2 | ‖a‖2 ≤ 1}, B = R2, ψ1(x1, x2) = sin(x1)×
sin(x2) for (x1, x2) ∈ ∂X , and f(x) = −(∆u(x)+‖∇u(x)‖2−0.5 ‖∇u(x)‖22−λu(x)) with u(x1, x2) =
sin(x1)× sin(x2) for x = (x1, x2) ∈ X . Note that the exact solution is v(x1, x2) = sin(x1)× sin(x2)
on X = [0, 1]× [0, 1] and is represented in Figure 3. Indeed, by convex duality (or computation of
Fenchel-Legendre transformations [52]), we have that
‖u‖2 = max‖a‖2≤1,a∈Rd
a · u and 1
2
‖u‖22 = max
b∈Rd
b · u− 1
2
‖b‖22
for all u ∈ Rd, a = u‖u‖22 and b = u are optimal solutions in these equations.
To solve Equation (23), we first discretize the domain [0, 1]× [0, 1] on a grid with m+1 points in
each direction, i.e. with a discretization step h = 1m and we obtain a discrete space Xh with bound-
ary ∂Xh. We denote by xi = ih with i = 0, . . . ,m such that Xh = {(xi, xj) | i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}}
and ∂Xh = {(xi, xj) | i ∈ {0,m} , j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} or j ∈ {0,m} , i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}}. Then, using the
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discretization scheme (16)- (17), Equation (23) becomes for (xi, xj) ∈ Xh :
0 = max
(a1,a2)∈A
min
(b1,b2)∈B
{(−4v(xi, xj) + v(xi+1, xj) + v(xi−1, xj) + v(xi, xj+1) + v(xi, xj−1)
h2
)
+ (a1 − b1)
(
v(xi+1, xj)− v(xi, xj)
h
)
1I(a1−b1)≥0 + (a1 − b1)
(
v(xi, xj)− v(xi−1, xj)
h
)
1I(a1−b1)<0
+ (a2 − b2)
(
v(xi, xj+1)− v(xi, xj)
h
)
1I(a2−b2)≥0 + (a2 − b2)
(
v(xi, xj)− v(xi, xj−1)
h
)
1I(a2−b2)<0
− λv(xi, xj) + b
2
1 + b
2
2
2
+ f(xi, xj)
}
,
multiply by h
2
c , where c = 4 + h |a1 − b1|+ h |a2 − b2| > 0, and adding v(xi, xj) on both sides, we
obtain :
v(xi, xj) = max
(a1,a2)∈A
min
(b1,b2)∈B
(
1 +
h2
c
λ
)−1
{(
1
c
+
h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)≥0
)
v(xi+1, xj) +
(
1
c
− h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)<0
)
v(xi−1, xj)
+
(
1
c
+
h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)≥0
)
v(xi, xj+1) +
(
1
c
− h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)<0
)
v(xi, xj−1)
+
h2
c
b21 + b
2
2
2
+
h2
c
f(xi, xj)
}
for (xi, xj) ∈ Xh , (24)
where v(xi, xj) is replaced by ψ1(xi, xj) for (xi, xj) ∈ ∂Xh. This equation has the form of Equa-
tion (5) with a discount factor µ equal to (1+ h
2
c λ)
−1 ≤ 1, transition probabilities from (xi, xj) ∈ Xh
to (xi′ , xj′ ) ∈ Xh are given by :
p((xi′ , xj′ )|(xi, xj), (a1, a2), (b1, b2)) =
1
c
+
h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)≥0 if i
′
= i+ 1, j
′
= j , (25)
1
c
− h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)<0 if i
′
= i− 1, j′ = j ,
1
c
+
h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)≥0 if i
′
= i, j
′
= j + 1 ,
1
c
− h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)<0 if i
′
= i, j
′
= j − 1 ,
0 else ,
and the running cost is, for (xi, xj) ∈ Xh :
r((xi, xj), (a1, a2), (b1, b2)) =
h2
c
(
b21 + b
2
2
2
+ f(xi, xj)
)
+
(
h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)≥0
)
ψ1(xi+1, xj)1I(xi+1,xj)∈∂Xh
−
(
h
c
(a1 − b1)1I(a1−b1)<0
)
ψ1(xi−1, xj)1I(xi−1,xj)∈∂Xh
+
(
h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)≥0
)
ψ1(xi, xj+1)1I(xi,xj+1)∈∂Xh
−
(
h
c
(a2 − b2)1I(a2−b2)<0
)
ψ1(xi, xj−1)1I(xi,xj−1)∈∂Xh .
Note that when i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,m − 2} the sum of the transition probabilities from (xi, xj) to the
points of Xh equals µ, when i or j is in {1,m − 1} this sum is strictly less than µ. Hence, the
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Table 1: Numerical results for equation (23) on a 1025× 1025 points grid.
Policy iteration with LU
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 3 8.51e− 7 5.96e− 7 4.47e− 2 2.48e− 2 1.40e+ 2
2 2 2.44e− 8 6.16e− 9 1.84e− 4 1.05e− 4 2.31e+ 2
3 1 7.38e− 13 2.03e− 13 4.13e− 6 2.16e− 6 2.77e+ 2
AMGpi
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 3 8.51e− 7 5.96e− 7 4.47e− 2 2.48e− 2 2.65e+ 1
2 2 2.44e− 8 6.16e− 9 1.84e− 4 1.05e− 4 4.59e+ 1
3 1 7.92e− 13 2.02e− 13 4.13e− 6 2.16e− 6 5.56e+ 1
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Figure 4: Comparison between AMGpi versus policy iteration algorithm with a LU solver for solving
equation (23) when increasing the size of the problem.
matrix Mα,β in (21) is substochastic, and since it is irreducible, it has a spectral radius strictly
less than one. So even when λ = 0 or equivalently µ = 1, the system (21) has an unique solution
and the dynamic programing equations has also an unique solution. Hence, we shall take λ = 0 in
the numerical tests. Note also that for this example, the matrices Mα,β in (21) are not symmetric
but close to be symmetric when h is small, since the non-symmetric part correspond to the order
one term in equation (24) and are dominated by order two terms when b is optimal in (24).
In tables 1, we present numerical results when equations (23) is discretized on a grid with 1025
points in each direction, i.e. with a discretization step of h = 1/210. The stopping criterion for
the policy iterations is  = 10−10. The first table of 1 shows the results of the policy iteration
algorithm with a direct solver LU (we used the package UMFPACK [21]) and the second table of 1
the results of AMGpi. We observe that AMGpi solves the problem faster than the policy iterations
with a direct solver. In both tables, we see that only three steps on max policies are needed (first
column) and a total of six steps on min policies (second column) which involves the resolution of
six linear systems. The small number of iterations is due to the fact that the solution is regular.
In table 2, we show that the computation time is improved when applying FAMGpi with c = 0.1
to the same example. In this case, the problem is solved in approximately 18s.
In figure 4, we compare the policy iteration algorithm with a direct solver LU (UMFPACK [21])
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Table 2: Numerical results for Equation (23) on a 1025× 1025 points grid, computed by FAMGpi
with c = 10−1.
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
points in each direction : 3, h 5.00e− 01
1 2 1.42e− 01 1.42e− 01 1.07e− 01 1.07e− 01 << 1
2 1 2.34e− 03 2.34e− 03 2.45e− 04 2.45e− 04 << 1
points in each direction : 5, h 2.50e− 01
1 2 5.53e− 03 2.84e− 03 3.00e− 03 1.75e− 03 << 1
points in each direction : 9, h 1.25e− 01
1 2 2.40e− 04 1.10e− 04 8.20e− 04 4.46e− 04 << 1
points in each direction : 17, h 6.25e− 02
1 2 3.18e− 05 7.83e− 06 3.36e− 04 1.90e− 04 1.00e− 02
points in each direction : 33, h 3.12e− 02
1 1 5.89e− 04 7.08e− 05 5.05e− 04 1.99e− 04 1.00e− 02
points in each direction : 65, h 1.56e− 02
1 1 1.69e− 04 1.25e− 05 1.62e− 04 4.67e− 05 4.00e− 02
points in each direction : 129, h 7.81e− 03
1 1 4.28e− 05 2.16e− 06 4.73e− 05 1.21e− 05 1.80e− 01
points in each direction : 257, h 3.91e− 03
1 1 1.08e− 05 3.77e− 07 1.31e− 05 6.07e− 06 7.50e− 01
points in each direction : 513, h 1.95e− 03
1 1 2.70e− 06 6.61e− 08 7.29e− 06 3.56e− 06 3.13e+ 00
points in each direction : 1025, h 9.77e− 04
1 2 1.23e− 10 8.13e− 13 4.16e− 06 2.17e− 06 1.85e+ 01
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Figure 5: Number of iterations on min policies (i.e the number of linear systems solved) for solving
equation (23) when increasing the size of the problem corresponding to figure 4 for both methods
(AMGpi and policy iteration algorithm with LU).
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s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 2.15e− 04 1.52e− 04 4.45e− 02 2.50e− 02 5.00e− 02
2 2 4, 3 5.97e− 06 1.59e− 06 2.36e− 04 1.43e− 04 1.00e− 01
3 1 3 3.02e− 09 7.47e− 10 6.49e− 05 3.44e− 05 1.30e− 01
Table 3: Numerical results with a 65× 65 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 5.40e− 05 3.80e− 05 4.46e− 02 2.49e− 02 2.30e− 01
2 2 4, 3 1.53e− 06 3.95e− 07 2.07e− 04 1.23e− 04 4.30e− 01
3 1 3 4.08e− 10 9.65e− 11 3.28e− 05 1.72e− 05 5.40e− 01
Table 4: Numerical results with a 129× 129 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 1.35e− 05 9.51e− 06 4.47e− 02 2.49e− 02 1.06e+ 00
2 2 4, 3 3.86e− 07 9.86e− 08 1.94e− 04 1.13e− 04 1.98e+ 00
3 1 3 5.17e− 11 1.22e− 11 1.65e− 05 8.63e− 06 2.49e+ 00
Table 5: Numerical results with a 257× 257 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 3.39e− 06 2.38e− 06 4.47e− 02 2.48e− 02 4.55e+ 00
2 2 4, 3 9.71e− 08 2.46e− 08 1.87e− 04 1.08e− 04 8.28e+ 00
3 1 3 6.26e− 12 1.55e− 12 8.26e− 06 4.31e− 06 1.04e+ 01
Table 6: Numerical results with a 513× 513 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 8.48e− 07 5.95e− 07 4.47e− 02 2.48e− 02 1.85e+ 01
2 2 4, 3 2.43e− 08 6.15e− 09 1.83e− 04 1.05e− 04 3.40e+ 01
3 1 3 7.40e− 13 2.02e− 13 4.13e− 06 2.16e− 06 4.27e+ 01
Table 7: Numerical results with a 1025× 1025 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
s kmax AMG ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 2 5, 4 2.12e− 07 1.49e− 07 4.47e− 02 2.48e− 02 7.46e+ 01
2 2 4, 3 6.09e− 09 1.54e− 09 1.82e− 04 1.04e− 04 1.38e+ 02
3 1 3 1.13e− 13 3.04e− 14 2.07e− 06 1.08e− 06 1.72e+ 02
Table 8: Numerical results with a 2049× 2049 points grid, computed by AMGpi for equation (23).
and AMGpi for solving equation (24), when increasing by one the number of discretization points
in each direction from m = 5 to m = 1500. The stopping criterion for the policy iterations is
 = 10−10. In figure 5, we represent the corresponding number of iterations on min policies, i.e
the number of linear systems solved for each size of problem, this number is the same for both
methods. We can see that the most part of the computation time for the resolution of the non-
linear equation (24) is used to solved the linear systems involved in the policy iteration. We also
remark that the computation time for AMGpi seems to grow linearly with the size of the problem.
Each table 3 to 8 contains numerical results for Equation (23) discretized on grids with dis-
cretization step h = 126 , h =
1
27 , h =
1
28 , h =
1
29 , h =
1
210 and h =
1
211 respectively. For these tests,
the stopping criterion for the policy iterations is  = 0.001h2 where h is the discretization step.
The stopping criterion for the linear solver AMG is ‖r‖2 < 10−12 where r is the residual for the
linear system. For each line of the tables, the third column, named AMG, contains the number of
iterations needed by AMG for solving each linear system (kmax systems per line). We can see that
the number of iterations of AMG is independent of the size of the problem. Note that the norm
of the error ‖e‖ decrease slowly when the grid becomes finer, this is because the exact solution
(Figure 3) is smooth and a small number of points is sufficient to get a good approximation, also
the non-linearity of the problem gives a worse approximation than one might expect in the linear
case. But a smooth solution is generally more difficult for linear iterative solvers.
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6.2 Optimal stopping game
Next tests concern an optimal stopping time game where the value v : X → R of the game is
solution of the variational inequality :
max
a∈A
minb∈B
(
0.5∆v(x)− (b · ∇v(x)) + ‖b‖
2
2
2
+ f(x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1©
, ψ2(x)− v(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2©
 = 0 x in X
v(x) = ψ1(x) x in ∂X
(26)
where X =]0, 1[×]0, 1[ is the unit square, the sets A = {0, 1}, B = R2, ψ2(x1, x2) = 0 for (x1, x2) ∈
X , for (x1, x2) ∈ X :
f(x1, x2) =
{ −(0.5∆u(x1, x2)− 0.5 ‖∇u(x1, x2)‖22) if x2 ≥ (x1 − 0.5)2 + 0.1
0.5∆u(x1, x2)− 0.5 ‖∇u(x1, x2)‖22 else ,
and for (x1, x2) ∈ ∂X : ψ1(x1, x2) = u(x1, x2) where
u(x1, x2) =
{
(x2 − ((x1 − 0.5)2 + 0.1))3 if x2 ≥ (x1 − 0.5)2 + 0.1
0 else .
The definitions of the functions f , ψ1 and ψ2 are chosen such that the function u, represented in
Figure 6, is solution of (26) almost everywhere and such that the terms 1© and 2© in Equation (26)
are non positive for all x ∈ X (this condition must hold for the variational inequality to be well-
defined). This example leads to a free boundary problem for the actions of max. Indeed, the points
of the state space Xh can be divided in two parts, the points where max chooses action 1 (means
continue to play) and the points where max chooses action 0 (means that he stops the game).
For (x1, x2) ∈ Xh, the optimal strategy α for max is α(x1, x2) = 1 if x2 ≥ (x1 − 0.5)2 + 0.1 and
α(x1, x2) = 0 else, for all (x1, x2) ∈ X .
As for the previous example, the domain X is discretized on a grid with m + 1 points in each
direction, i.e. with a discretization step h = 1m and we obtain a discrete space Xh with boundary
∂Xh. Then, Equation (26) is discretized by using the discretization scheme (16)- (17). After, the
equations 1© and 2© are simplified separately by keeping equations (14) true. In this case, only
equation 1© is multiply by h2c with c an appropriate constant. After discretization, we obtain the
following dynamic programming equation for a game with state space Xh :
v(xi, xj) = max
{
min
(b1,b2)∈B
(
1
2c
− b1h
c
1Ib1≤0
)
v(xi+1, xj) +
(
1
2c
+ b1
h
c
1Ib1>0
)
v(xi−1, xj)
+
(
1
2c
− b2h
c
1Ib2≤0
)
v(xi, xj+1) +
(
1
2c
+ b2
h
c
1Ib2>0
)
v(xi, xj−1)
+
h2
c
b21 + b
2
2
2
+
h2
c
f(xi, xj), ψ2(xi, xj)
}
for (xi, xj) ∈ Xh
with c = 2 + h |b1| + h |b2| > 0 and v(xi, xj) = ψ1(xi, xj) for (xi, xj) ∈ ∂Xh. The same com-
ments about non-symmetry and the discount factor in equation (24) hold here. That is λ = 0 or
equivalently µ = 1.
The numerical results are performed for Equation (26) when discretized on a grid with 1025
points in each direction. In the domain Xh, for a fixed strategy α of max, we represent a points x
with a green color when α(x) = 1, that is where max decides to continue playing, and with a blue
color when α(x) = 0, that is when max decides to stop the game. The optimal strategy for max is
to have only green points above the red curve, x2 = (x1 − 0.5)2 + 0.1, and only blue points under.
We start the tests with α(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , that is with blue points in the whole domain.
Numerical results with AMGpi are shown geometrically in Figure 7 where the strategies of
max obtained after 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600 and 700 iterations are represented. We observe
in Table 9 that AMGpi finds an approximation of the solution after 702 iterations and in about
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Figure 6: Graph of the solution of equation (26).
Table 9: Numerical results for optimal stopping time game (26) with a 1025 × 1025 points grid,
computed by AMGpi with  = 10−14.
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 0 3.645e− 01 9.195e− 03 7.243e− 01 1.998e− 01 1.790e+ 00
2 4 1.497e− 01 1.347e− 03 3.782e− 01 1.218e− 01 1.376e+ 01
3 4 1.094e− 01 8.839e− 04 3.767e− 01 1.213e− 01 2.492e+ 01
. . .
100 3 1.744e− 02 4.444e− 05 2.392e− 01 8.016e− 02 1.009e+ 03
. . .
200 3 7.398e− 03 1.879e− 05 1.222e− 01 3.996e− 02 2.214e+ 03
. . .
300 3 2.510e− 03 8.779e− 06 5.614e− 02 1.728e− 02 3.619e+ 03
. . .
400 2 1.258e− 03 4.363e− 06 2.321e− 02 6.519e− 03 4.770e+ 03
. . .
500 2 4.761e− 04 1.620e− 06 6.601e− 03 1.532e− 03 5.861e+ 03
. . .
600 2 8.857e− 05 2.781e− 07 7.274e− 04 9.598e− 05 7.045e+ 03
. . .
650 2 1.533e− 05 4.231e− 08 1.538e− 04 6.331e− 05 7.630e+ 03
. . .
700 1 5.647e− 08 8.734e− 11 1.571e− 04 6.619e− 05 8.134e+ 03
701 1 1.207e− 08 2.267e− 11 1.571e− 04 6.619e− 05 8.141e+ 03
702 1 9.992e− 16 7.284e− 17 1.571e− 04 6.619e− 05 8.148e+ 03
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g)
Figure 7: Application of AMGpi to the free boundary problem (26) for a 1025× 1025 points grid :
(a) after 100 iterations, (b) after 200 iterations, (c) after 300 iterations, (d) after 400 iterations,
(e) after 500 iterations, (f) after 600 iterations and (g) after 700 iterations.
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Table 10: Numerical results for optimal stopping time game (26) with a 1025 × 1025 points grid,
computed by FAMGpi with c = 10−2 and  = 10−14.
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
points in each direction : 3, step size : 5.00e− 01
1 1 2.17e− 01 2.17e− 01 1.53e− 01 1.53e− 01 << 1
2 2 2.64e− 05 2.64e− 05 3.92e− 02 3.92e− 02 << 1
points in each direction : 5, step size : 2.50e− 01
1 2 2.19e− 04 8.41e− 05 3.02e− 02 1.71e− 02 << 1
points in each direction : 9, step size : 1.25e− 01
1 2 4.99e− 03 1.06e− 03 1.65e− 02 7.99e− 03 << 1
2 1 2.68e− 03 5.41e− 04 1.66e− 02 8.15e− 03 << 1
3 1 2.72e− 04 5.49e− 05 1.68e− 02 8.30e− 03 << 1
points in each direction : 17, step size : 6.25e− 02
1 2 2.26e− 03 5.44e− 04 8.75e− 03 3.89e− 03 << 1
2 1 7.97e− 04 1.23e− 04 8.84e− 03 3.97e− 03 << 1
3 1 4.65e− 04 5.97e− 05 8.98e− 03 4.11e− 03 << 1
4 1 9.57e− 08 1.24e− 08 9.01e− 03 4.14e− 03 1.00e− 02
points in each direction : 33, step size : 3.12e− 02
1 1 2.10e− 04 1.90e− 05 4.94e− 03 2.16e− 03 1.00e− 02
2 1 1.05e− 04 6.57e− 06 4.76e− 03 2.09e− 03 2.00e− 02
points in each direction : 65, step size : 1.56e− 02
1 1 6.26e− 05 6.43e− 06 2.49e− 03 1.07e− 03 4.00e− 02
2 1 3.64e− 05 2.09e− 06 2.45e− 03 1.05e− 03 7.00e− 02
points in each direction : 129, step size : 7.81e− 03
1 1 7.67e− 06 3.88e− 07 1.25e− 03 5.33e− 04 1.60e− 01
points in each direction : 257, step size : 3.91e− 03
1 1 2.86e− 06 1.12e− 07 6.28e− 04 2.66e− 04 6.20e− 01
points in each direction : 513, step size : 1.95e− 03
1 1 5.33e− 07 1.44e− 08 3.15e− 04 1.33e− 04 2.49e+ 00
points in each direction : 1025, step size : 9.77e− 04
1 2 1.79e− 07 3.82e− 09 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 1.58e+ 01
2 1 9.66e− 08 8.84e− 10 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 2.30e+ 01
3 1 5.39e− 08 4.10e− 10 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 3.00e+ 01
4 1 2.86e− 08 1.31e− 10 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 3.70e+ 01
5 1 7.41e− 09 1.60e− 11 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 4.34e+ 01
6 1 8.88e− 16 7.31e− 17 1.57e− 04 6.62e− 05 4.99e+ 01
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Figure 8: Application FAMGpi to the free boundary problem (26) for: (a) 9 × 9 points grid, (b)
17× 17 points grid, (c) 33× 33 points grid, (d) 65× 65 points grid.
two hours and 15 minutes. The stopping criterion for policy iterations of AMGpi in this test is
 = 1014. This criterion was chosen to ensure the convergence of the policy iterations, indeed with
a smaller  it did not converge because the intern policy iterations did not gave a precise enough
approximation.
In table 10, we present numerical results for the application of FAMGpi with c = 10−2 and
 = 10−14 to problem (26) for a 1025 × 1025 points grid. We observe that our algorithm solves
the problem in about 49 seconds. Geometrical representation of the strategies of max obtained by
AMGpi on four successive levels in the FAMGpi algorithm, are shown in Figure 8. We can see that
on coarse grids, the algorithm can find a good approximation of the solution in a few iterations.
The interpolation of this solution and the corresponding strategies, are used to start AMGpi on
the next fine level and we observe that only a few numbers of policy iterations are needed on each
level.
With this example we show the advantage of using FAMGpi. Indeed, the computation time of
the FAMGpi algorithm seems to be in the order of the number of discretization points whereas that
of a AMGpi algorithm is about 160 times greater. This is due to the large number of iterations
needed by AMGpi for solving this kind of games. Indeed, this number should be compared to the
diameter of the graph (that is the largest number of edges which must be cover to travel from
one point to another) associated to the corresponding game problem, for instance the union of all
graphs of the Markov chains associated to all couple of fixed policies α and β. Hence due to the
finite differences discretization, the arcs of the graphs are supported by edges of the grids Xh in
Z2, so the diameter is 2m with m = 1024.
6.3 Stopping game with two optimal stopping
In this example, we consider a stopping game where both players have the possibility to stop the
game, see [33] for a complete theory about this subject. In this case, the value of the game starting
in x ∈ X is given by :
v(x) = sup
κ1
inf
κ2
{
Eκ1,κ2x
[ ∫ κ1∧κ2
0
r(ξt, ηt) dt+ ψ1(ξκ1) 1Iκ1<κ2 + ψ2(ξκ2) 1Iκ2≤κ1
∣∣∣ ξ0 = x ] }
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where κ1 ∧ κ2 = min (κ1, κ2) and we assume min (κ1, κ2) < τ (τ = inf {t ≥ 0|ξt /∈ X}, then v is
solution of equation :
max
{
ψ1(x)− v(x), min {ψ2(x)− v(x) , L(v;x) + r(x)}
}
= 0 for x in X , (27)
or equivalently, {
(L(v;x) + r(x))(w(x)− v(x)) ≤ 0 for x ∈ X ,
∀w, ψ1 ≤ w ≤ ψ2 and ψ1 ≤ v ≤ ψ2 ,
that is
for x ∈ X
 (L(v;x) + r(x)) ≤ 0 if v(x) = ψ1(x)(L(v;x) + r(x)) ≥ 0 if v(x) = ψ2(x)
(L(v;x) + r(x)) = 0 if ψ1(x) < v(x) < ψ2(x).
For the numerical tests, we consider the stochastic differential game whose value v is solution
of :
max
{
ψ1(x)− v(x), min {ψ2(x)− v(x) , 0.5∇(x) + r(x)}
}
= 0 for x in X , (28)
where X = [0, 1], for all x ∈ X : ψ1(x) = −ψ¯2, ψ2(x) = ψ¯2 with ψ¯2 = (2 cos(0.09pi) + pi(0.18 −
1) sin(0.09pi))/2) ≈ 0.6 and r(x) = 0.5pi2 cos(pix). For all x ∈ X , the sets of actions are A = {0, 1}
for max and B = {0, 1} for min, where action 0 means that the player chooses to stop the game
and receive ψ1 when max stops or ψ2 when min stops, action 1 means that the game is continuing.
Here, the exact solution of Equation (28) in the viscosity sense is
for x ∈ X
 ψ1(x) for x > (1− 0.09)ψ2(x) for x < 0.09
cos(pix) + pi sin(0.09pi)x+ c for 0.09 > x > (1− 0.09)
where the constant c = (ψ¯2 − cos(0.09pi) − 0.09pi sin(0.09pi)) and is represented in Figure 9. For
all x ∈ X , the optimal strategy for max is α(x) = 0 if x > (1 − 0.09) and α(x) = 1 else. For all
x ∈ X , the optimal strategy for min is β(x) = 0 if x < (0.09) and β(x) = 1 else.
We present numerical results for the discretization of Equation (28) on a grid with 2049 points
in Table 11 when using AMGpi with  = 10−10 and in Table 12 when using FAMGpi with c = 10−2
and  = 10−10. As in the previous example, we see the advantage of using FAMGpi for this kind
of games. Indeed, FAMGpi solves the problem in about one second while AMGpi needs about
24 minutes. As for the previous example, the computation time of the FAMGpi seems to be in
the order of the number of discretization points. For this example, due to the finite differences
discretization, the diameter of the graph is m with m = 2048. We see in Table 11 that both
numbers of intern and external policy iterations for AMGpi are of the order of the diameter of the
graph.
7 Conclusion and perspective
In this paper, we have presented our algorithm AMGpi for solving two player zero-sum stochastic
games. This program combines the policy iteration algorithm with algebraic multigrid methods.
Our experiences on a Isaacs equation show better results for AMGpi in comparison with policy
iteration combined to a direct linear solver. We observed that the most part of the computation
time for the resolution of a non-linear equation (5) is used to solved the linear systems involved in
the policy iteration algorithm. Hence, we noticed that the computation time of AMGpi increase
linearly with the size of the problem.
Furthermore, we also presented a full multi-level algorithm, called FAMGpi, for solving two
player zero-sum stochastic differential games. The numerical results on some stopping differential
stochastic games presented here show that FAMGpi improves substantially the computation time
of the policy iteration algorithm for this kind of games. Indeed the computation time of FAMGpi
seems to be in the order of the number of discretization points whereas that of AMGpi algorithm
is about 160 to 1700 times greater. This is due to the large number of iterations needed by AMGpi
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Figure 9: Solution of Equation (28)
Table 11: Numerical results for optimal stopping time game (28) with a 2049 × 2049 points grid,
computed by AMGpi with  = 10−10.
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
1 1 1.20e+ 00 7.80e− 01 7.75e− 01 2.91e− 01 << 1
2 863 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 6.02e− 01 3.00e− 01 1.58e+ 00
3 1025 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 6.03e− 01 3.00e− 01 3.31e+ 00
. . .
100 1026 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 7.10e− 01 2.46e− 01 1.81e+ 02
. . .
200 992 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 8.16e− 01 1.93e− 01 3.75e+ 02
. . .
300 947 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 9.16e− 01 1.44e− 01 5.72e+ 02
. . .
400 910 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.00e+ 00 1.01e− 01 7.73e+ 02
. . .
500 882 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.08e+ 00 6.59e− 02 9.78e+ 02
. . .
600 862 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.14e+ 00 4.05e− 02 1.19e+ 03
. . .
700 849 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.18e+ 00 2.84e− 02 1.41e+ 03
. . .
800 843 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.20e+ 00 2.65e− 02 1.64e+ 03
. . .
839 843 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.20e+ 00 2.66e− 02 1.73e+ 03
840 843 2.03e− 07 4.50e− 09 5.22e− 07 2.57e− 07 1.74e+ 03
841 1 1.11e− 16 6.57e− 18 1.16e− 07 7.40e− 08 1.74e+ 03
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Table 12: Numerical results for optimal stopping time game (28) with a 2049 × 2049 points grid,
computed by FAMGpi with c = 10−2 and  = 10−10.
s kmax ‖rv‖∞ ‖rv‖L2 ‖e‖∞ ‖e‖L2 cpu time (s)
points in each direction : 3, step size : 5.00e− 01
1 2 1.20e+ 00 1.20e+ 00 6.01e− 01 6.01e− 01 << 1
2 2 0.00e+ 00 0.00e+ 00 5.55e− 17 5.55e− 17 << 1
points in each direction : 5, step size : 2.50e− 01
1 2 1.56e− 01 9.02e− 02 1.13e− 01 1.03e− 01 << 1
2 1 1.89e− 17 1.09e− 17 1.13e− 01 9.22e− 02 << 1
points in each direction : 9, step size : 1.25e− 01
1 2 1.20e+ 00 4.54e− 01 8.74e− 01 3.52e− 01 << 1
2 5 1.20e+ 00 4.54e− 01 1.09e+ 00 4.14e− 01 << 1
3 5 5.55e− 17 2.21e− 17 5.74e− 03 4.35e− 03 << 1
points in each direction : 17, step size : 6.25e− 02
1 2 1.20e+ 00 3.10e− 01 1.16e+ 00 3.00e− 01 << 1
2 10 1.28e− 03 3.30e− 04 5.19e− 03 2.83e− 03 << 1
3 1 0.00e+ 00 0.00e+ 00 3.36e− 03 2.10e− 03 << 1
points in each direction : 33, step size : 3.12e− 02
1 2 0.00e+ 00 0.00e+ 00 1.36e− 04 9.50e− 05 << 1
points in each direction : 65, step size : 1.56e− 02
1 2 1.20e+ 00 1.51e− 01 1.20e+ 00 1.51e− 01 << 1
2 28 0.00e+ 00 0.00e+ 00 7.08e− 05 4.94e− 05 << 1
points in each direction : 129, step size : 7.81e− 03
1 2 1.20e+ 00 1.07e− 01 1.20e+ 00 1.07e− 01 << 1
2 54 2.78e− 17 3.75e− 18 6.66e− 05 3.85e− 05 2.00e− 02
points in each direction : 257, step size : 3.91e− 03
1 2 1.20e+ 00 7.53e− 02 1.20e+ 00 7.52e− 02 2.00e− 02
2 108 1.20e+ 00 7.53e− 02 1.20e+ 00 7.53e− 02 7.00e− 02
3 107 1.11e− 16 8.53e− 18 1.61e− 06 1.05e− 06 1.30e− 01
points in each direction : 513, step size : 1.95e− 03
1 2 1.20e+ 00 5.32e− 02 1.20e+ 00 5.32e− 02 1.30e− 01
2 212 1.11e− 16 9.82e− 18 4.53e− 07 3.02e− 07 3.00e− 01
points in each direction : 1025, step size : 9.77e− 04
1 2 1.20e+ 00 3.76e− 02 1.20e+ 00 3.76e− 02 3.00e− 01
2 422 1.11e− 16 1.15e− 17 1.69e− 07 1.18e− 07 9.40e− 01
points in each direction : 2049, step size : 4.88e− 04
1 2 2.03e− 07 4.50e− 09 5.22e− 07 2.57e− 07 9.40e− 01
2 1 1.11e− 16 8.52e− 18 1.16e− 07 7.40e− 08 9.50e− 01
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for solving this kind of games. Indeed, this number should be compared to the diameter of the
graph associated to the corresponding game problem, for instance the union of all graphs of the
Markov chains associated to fixed policies α and β.
The FAMGpi algorithm uses coarse grids discretizations of the partial differential equation and
so cannot be applied directly to the dynamic programming equation of a two player zero-sum
stochastic game with finite state space. One may ask if adapting the FAMGpi algorithm to this
kind of games is possible. Indeed, the complexity of two player zero-sum stochastic games is still
unsettled, one only knows that it belongs to the complexity class of NP∩coNP [49], and any new
approach maybe useful to understand this complexity.
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